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eignty. It is, instead, based on the practical plausibility of the 
idea that in our contemporary democracy, rights and politics go 
hand in hand. 
OUTSIDER VOICES ON GUNS AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 
FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, 
AND THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS, 1866-1876. By 
Stephen P. Halbrook. 1 Westport, Ct. Praeger Publishers. 
1998. Pp. xiii, 230. Hardcover. $55.00 
Nelson Lund2 
If there is any good justification for the economic cartel in 
legal services, perhaps it lies in our aspirations as a learned pro-
fession. In recent years, those aspirations-or pretensions-
have been looking insecure. On one side, the practice of law has 
become harder to distinguish from other business ventures, for it 
is increasingly specialized and ever more openly oriented toward 
profit maximization. On another side, legal academics seem to 
have less and less to do with the practicing bar and the concerns 
of its members. At least in law schools where scholarship is re-
warded, success is practically defined as getting yourself taken 
seriously by other academics at similar institutions. When 
someone is said to deserve tenure on the basis of a "widely 
cited" article, it's usually assumed that this does not refer to cita-
tions in CLE materials or legal briefs. 
I. Allorney at Law Fairfax, Virginia. Cases argued in the U.S. Supreme Court 
include Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
2. Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. Thanks to Stephen 
G. Gilles, Mara S. Lund, and John 0. McGinnis for helpful comments, and to George 
Mason Law School for research support. 
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Notwithstanding these trends, and whatever the net of their 
advantages and disadvantages may be, law has not simply ceased 
to be a scholarly profession. For two reasons, the publication of 
Stephen P. Halbrook's Freedmen, the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and the Right to Bear Arms, 1866-1876, provides a fitting occa-
sion to celebrate the contributions that practicing lawyers can 
make to academic life. First, law professors have recently and 
belatedly begun to think about the Second Amendment, a de-
velopment that occurred only after the ground had been broken 
by practitioners like Halbrook and Don B. Kates, Jr. These pio-
neers have had to fight long and hard before receiving the satis-
faction of seeing their claims taken seriously by the academic es-
tablishment. Second, Halbrook's latest contribution focuses on 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause,3 another constitutional pro-
vision that has been revived as a serious subject of study in sig-
nificant part through the efforts of learned legal practitioners. In 
the course of celebrating such contributions from outside the 
academy, we should also pause to ask why they were needed. 
I'll return to that question at the end of this review. 
Halbrook's book presents a chronological account of the 
background and evolution of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
several important pieces of related legislation, as well as of initial 
enforcement efforts during Reconstruction. Halbrook's eye is 
always focused on showing that protection of the freedmen's 
right to arms was both a central and a "cutting edge" element in 
the Reconstruction effort. This is followed by a very detailed 
description of the events leading up to the Supreme Court's de-
cision in United States v. Cruikshank. 4 This case arose when fed-
eral authorities used the Enforcement Act of 1870 to prosecute a 
number of whites who had allegedly participated in a massacre 
of black citizens. In a decision that Halbrook treats as the death 
knell for Reconstruction, the Supreme Court held that the in-
dictment was legally insufficient. 
Halbrook's exploration of Reconstruction history is a 
means to other ends. His principal goals are to show that the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause prohibits infringement by the 
states of the right to keep and bear arms, that the Supreme 
Court has never decided otherwise, and that the Court should 
now decide that the Fourteenth Amendment does protect that 
3. U.S. Cons!., Amend. XIV, § 1: "No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United Stati:S." 
4. 92 U.S. 542 (1875). 
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right. Though it does not fully address every question relevant 
to its thesis, this book is a valuable addition to the literature, and 
it deserves more serious consideration than it is likely to get to-
day. But perhaps its time will come. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE REDISCOVERY 
OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT 
Before turning to the issues raised by Halbrook's book, let's 
set the stage. For well over a century after its ratification, the 
Second Amendment was barely noticed by the courts.5 And un-
derstandably so. The federal government was not in the busi-
ness of infringing the right to arms, and Second Amendment 
challenges to state laws were foreclosed by Barron v. Baltimore.6 
Eventually, in the aftermath of Prohibition, Congress enacted 
restrictions on a few "gangster" weapons-machine guns, sawed-
off shotguns and rifles, and silencers. The Supreme Court re-
jected a Second Amendment challenge to this statute in a lazy 
and ambiguous 1939 opinion from which almost nothing-oral-
most anything-could be inferred.7 
The lower federal courts decided to infer a kind of nothing-
ness. For decades, they uniformly held that the right to keep 
and bear arms belonged only to governments,8 or at most was a 
right that individual citizens could exercise only in the service of 
their governments.9 The Supreme Court had never adopted ei-
ther of these propositions, and the lower courts accepted them 
on the basis of intuitions rather than cogent arguments. But 
they did so quite consistently. 10 Thus, the Second Amendment's 
5. Sec U.S. Canst., Amend. II ("A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the 
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be in-
fringed.") 
6. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (Bill of Rights applies only against federal govern-
ment). 
7. Sec United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
8. The leading case is United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261 (3d Cir. 1942), rev'd on 
other grounds, 319 U.S. 463 (1943). Tot featured the dictum that "this amendment, 
unlike those providing for protection of free speech and freedom of religion, was not 
adopted with individual rights in mind, but as a protection for the States in the mainte-
nance of their militia organizations against possible encroachments by the federal 
power." 131 F.2d at 266 (footnote citing Fedtralist Paptrs omitted). 
9. An early example of this variant is Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 923 (1st 
Cir. 1942), where the court rejected a Second Amendment claim by a defendant who had 
violated a federal statute forbidding those convicted of violent crimes from possessing 
firearms: "[T]here is no evidence that the [defendant] was or ever had been a member of 
any military organization or that his use of the weapon under the circumstances disclosed 
was in preparation for a military career." 
10. Until the recent decision in United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598 (N.D. 
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"right of the people" to keep and bear arms became as empty as 
the First Amendment's "right of the people" to petition the gov-
ernment would be if it belonged only to lobbyists employed by 
government agencies. Or as empty as the Fourth Amendment's 
"right of the people" to be secure against unreasonable searches 
and seizures would be if it applied only to the offices of govern-
ment officials. 
In 1965, a practicing lawyer named Robert Sprecher chal-
lenged the regnant "states' right" theory in an essay that he 
submitted in a contest sponsored by the American Bar Founda-
tion. Sprecher's essay, The Lost Amendment, won the contest 
and was published in the ABA Journa/. 11 The essay briefly 
sketched the historical roots of the right to arms and identified 
several arguments in favor of its rediscovery. As Sprecher ob-
served, the Second Amendment was adopted at a time when the 
armed citizenry, organized into a well trained militia, was widely 
regarded as an appropriately republican check on potentially ty-
rannical governments. But Sprecher argued that this did not 
necessarily imply that the right to arms had become outmoded 
or superfluous, let alone that it was a right belonging to govern-
ments rather than individuals. Notwithstanding the advent of 
the atomic age, he contended, a true citizen militia has utility for 
civil defense and even for the continued deterrence of political 
coups. Even more important, government's inability to suppress 
criminal violence and its increasing taste for discouraging legiti-
mate self defense had combined to embolden criminals while 
fostering a morally decadent national apathy. 12 Sprecher con-
cluded that the Second Amendment protects both the right to 
arm a state militia and the right of the individual to keep and 
bear arms for self defense, and he urged that the right actually 
be "enlarged" by applying it against the state governments 
through the ongoing process of Fourteenth Amendment incor-
poration. 
The Lost Amendment was itself promptly lost. 13 During the 
following two decades, a handful of practicing lawyers published 
Tex. 1999) (appeal pending), no statute had ever been invalidated by the federal courts 
on Second Amendment grounds. 
II. Robert A. Sprecher, The Lost Amendment, 51 A.B.A. 1. 554-57,665-69 (1965). 
12. This point has been developed with great force by another thoughtful practitio-
ner. Sec Jeffrey R. Snyder, A Nation of Cowards, 113 Pub. Interest 40 (1993). 
13. Apart from a few citations in articles written by practicing lawyers, I have found 
only one citation to Sprecher's Second Amendment analysis in any law review prior to 
the mid-1980's. This citation occurred in a footnote that dismissed the right to arms as 
obsolete without addressing Sprecher's arguments for the contrary conclusion. See Peter 
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articles suggesting that the Second Amendment guarantees an 
individual right to arms, 14 but their work was placed in obscure 
journals and was quite ignored by the academic establishment 
and the courts. Thus, Laurence Tribe's American Constitutional 
Law, which may serve as a handy proxy for establishment views, 
casually dismissed the Second Amendment in 1978 at the end of 
a footnote to a discussion of state sovereignty, claiming that "the 
sole concern of the second amendment's framers was to prevent 
such federal interferences with the state militia as would permit 
the establishment of a standing national army and the conse-
quent destruction of local autonomy." 15 
All of this should have changed in the early 1980s, when 
Halbrook and Kates published their first major works on the 
Second Amendment. Kates' article in the Michigan Law Review 
presented a detailed and thoroughly annotated critique of the 
judicially favored "states' right" interpretation, arguing at length 
its incompatibility with the constitutional language and with the 
historical and philosophical background against which that lan-
guage had been adopted. 16 Halbrook's even more ambitious 
book on the evolution of the right to arms undertook a survey 
extending all the way back to ancient Greece and exploring a 
wealth of English and American historical and legal materials. 17 
Like Kates (and Sprecher), Halbrook concluded that the Second 
Amendment protects an individual or private right, and that this 
right should be enforced against both the federal and state gov-
ernments. 
Although there are important points on which one can 
quarrel with Halbrook and Kates, one cannot quarrel with the 
proposition that they produced serious scholarship deserving of 
Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 Mich. L. Rev. 71,75-76 n.6 (1974). 
14. Sec, e.g., David T. Hardy and John Stompoly, Of Arms and the Law, 51 Chi.-
Kcnt L. Rev. 62 (1974); David I. Caplan, Restoring the Balance: The Second Amendmelll 
Revisited, 5 Fordham Urban L.J. 31 (1976); Robert Dowlut, The Right to Arms: Does the 
Constitution or the Predilection of Judges Reign?, 36 Okla. L. Rev. 65 (1983). 
15. Laun;nce H. Tribe, American Constillltional Law 226 n.6 (Foundation Press, 
1978). Professor Tribe purported to support this proposition by citing one fragment of 
legislative history. The cited snippet from the congressional debates neither said nor im-
plied any such thing. Professor Tribe also cited a series of three Supreme Court opinions 
that he asserted "comports with the narrowly limited aim of the amendment as merely 
ancillary to other constitutional guarantees of state sovereignty." Id. None of the cited 
cases said or implied that the Second Amendment has any such narrowly limited aim. 
16. See Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the 
Second Amendmelll, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 204 (1983). 
17. See Stephen P. Halbrook, That Every Man Be Armed: The Evolution of a Con-
stitutional Right (U. New Mexico Press, 1984). 
706 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol.17:701 
serious examination. But this is not how they were treated. In 
the 1988 edition of American Constitutional Law, for example, 
Professor Tribe repeated verbatim what he had said ten years 
earlier. He then added some additional remarks, and cited 
Kates' Michigan Law Review article. Rather than confront 
Kates' elaborate and thoroughly researched arguments, how-
ever, Professor Tribe concluded with the offhand comment that 
"the use in the amendment's preamble of the qualifying phrase 
'well regulated' makes any invocation of the amendment as are-
striction on state or local gun control measures extremely prob-
lematic. "18 
Things finally did begin to change in 1989. A constitutional 
law professor, whose introduction to the Second Amendment 
evidently came from outside the academy, published a comment 
in the Yale Law Journal sympathetically summarizing the argu-
ments that had been developed by Halbrook, Kates, and other 
non-academics. 19 Without endorsing their conclusions,20 he 
asked whether the principles generally espoused among his own 
"elite" portion of the bar did not require that such serious argu-
ments at least be seriously confronted. 21 The following decade 
produced a flood of writing, by members of the "elite" and oth-
ers,22 almost unanimously rejecting the judicially dominant 
state's right interpretation. In the latest edition of his treatise, 
Professor Tribe has finally conceded that the Second Amend-
ment recognizes "a right (admittedly of uncertain scope) on the 
part of individuals to possess and use firearms in the defense of 
themselves and their homes," and that this right may well be 
among the privileges and immunities protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment.23 
18. Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 299 n.6 (Foundation Press, 2d 
ed. 1988). 
19. Sec Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 Yale L.J. 637 
(1989). On the origins of this piece, sec id. at 637 n.t. 
20. !d. at 642 ("It is not my style to offer 'correct' or 'incorrect' interpretations of 
the Constitution."). 
21. !d. ("[W]e might consider the possibility that 'our' views of the Amendment, 
perhaps best reflected in Professor Tribe's offhand treatment of it, might themselves be 
[as] deserving of the 'tendentious' label [as the views of NRA advocates]"). 
22. Cf. id. at 639 n.13 ("One might well find this overt reference to 'elite' law re-
views and 'major' writers objectionable, but it is foolish to believe that these distinctions 
do not exist within the academy ... "). 
23. Laurence H. Tribe, 1 American Constitutional Law 902 n.221 (Foundation 
Press, 3d ed. 2000). Space limitations preclude a summary of the evidence and argu-
ments supporting this conclusion, which I believe are poorly presented in Professor 
Tribe's treatise. My own views are set forth in Nelson Lund, The Ends of Second 
Amendment Jurisprudence: Firearms Disabilities and Domestic Violence Restraining Or-
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A counter thrust now appears to be getting underway, and 
we can probably expect to see a new wave of scholarship de-
voted to undermining the consensus recognized by Professor 
Tribe. Several dozen law professors and historians, for example, 
recently signed a brief contending: "The Second Amendment is 
about the allocation of military force. Those who framed and 
ratified it intended to prevent the new central government from 
disarming the states' militia. Because the Statute [at issue in this 
case] has no effect on the militia, it does not violate the Second 
Amendment. "24 
But the odds of anyone finding solid grounds for such asser-
tions appear slim. One of the historians who signed this brief, 
for example, recently published a blunt article attacking the new 
consensus and claiming that "recent writing on the Second 
Amendment more closely resembles the intellectual equivalent 
of a check kiting scheme than it does solidly researched his-
tory."25 Archly noting that legal journals are typically not sub-
ject to blind peer review and that writers on the Second 
Amendment often cite one another,26 Professor Saul Cornell 
sought to explode the individual-right interpretation of the Sec-
ond Amendment by showing that its proponents "have not only 
read constitutional texts in an anachronistic fashion, but have 
also ignored important historical sources vital to understanding 
what Federalists and Anti-Federalists might have meant by the 
right to bear arms." 27 The demonstration consists largely of evi-
dence that some supporters of the Second Amendment were 
willing to use the power of state governments to restrict the right 
to arms. But so what? This is perfectly consistent with the claim 
that the Second Amendment was meant to protect the individual 
right to arms against the federal government. Professor Cornell 
has demolished a straw man,28 and it is revealing that the three 
ders, 4 Tex. Rev. L & Pol. 157 (1999); Nelson Lund, The Past and Future of the Individ-
ual's Right to Arms, 31 Ga. L. Rev. 1 (1996); Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Po-
litical Liberty, and the Right to Self-Preservation, 39 Ala. L Rev. 103 (1987). 
24. Brief for an Ad Hoc Group of Law Professors and Historians as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Appellant, United States v. Emerson, No. 99-10331 (appeal pending, U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit). I was the principal draftsman of a critique of this 
brief: Brief Supporting Appellee of Amicus Curiae Academics for the Second Amend-
ment, in the same case. 
25. Saul Cornell, Commonplace or Anachronism: The Standard Model, the Second 
Amendment, and the Problem of History in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 16 
Cons!. Comm. 221, 223 (1999). 
26. See id. at 223 n.lO. 
27. !d. at 223. 
28. This is not the only straw man to draw Professor Cornell's fire. For someone 
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historians who published comments on his article gave no hint 
that they noticed this fatal error. 29 We may see more of this kind 
of specious argumentation, but that would only serve to suggest 
the difficulty of actually refuting the arguments and evidence 
that Professor Cornell failed to address. 
II. THE SECOND AMENDMENT AND FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT INCORPORATION 
At least as an intellectual matter, the debate about the 
states' right versus individual right interpretations seems now to 
be essentially over. Because the Supreme Court has never en-
dorsed the states' right theory, one can reasonably hope that the 
Justices will resolve this issue correctly when they next choose to 
review a Second Amendment case. One reason for expecting 
that they might accept the overwhelmingly powerful arguments 
supporting the individual right interpretation, however, is that 
doing so will resolve very little. Once one agrees that the right 
to keep and bear arms belongs to individuals rather than to 
states, one immediately begins to confront a swarm of much 
more difficult questions. What is the scope of the right? To 
what kinds of arms does it apply? What level of "scrutiny" 
should courts apply when governmental restrictions are chal-
whose main point is to attack certain writers for engaging in "law office history" that fails 
"to adequately contextualize constitutional texts," Cornell, 16 Const. Comm. at 225 
(cited in note 25), Professor Cornell is surprisingly prone to distort his opponents' posi-
tions through omission and mischaracterization. Thus, for example, Eugene Volokh is 
assailed for "assum[ing] that a common set of terms implied a deeper consensus on what 
those terms meant.'' !d. at 224. In fact, however, the passage from Volokh cited by Pro-
fessor Cornell makes no such assumption. Volokh simply notes the indisputable fact that 
eighteenth century state constitutions protecting "the right of the people to bear arms'' 
necessarily protected a right belonging to someone other than the state, and claims that 
this "suggests" that the Second Amendment likewise refers to a right of individuals. Vo-
lokh's claim is both plausible and modest, and it docs not entail the unjustified assump-
tion that Professor Cornell imputes to him. Similarly, Glenn Harlan Reynolds is cited for 
advancing the questionable proposition that "the Second Amendment was intended by 
the framers to incorporate a right of revolution into the fabric of constitutionalism." !d. 
at 237 n.57. But when one Iouks up the citation, it turns out that Reynolds didn't say this. 
What he said was that two state constitutions of the period contained an explicit recogni-
tion of the right of citizens to rebel against a tyrannical government, so that "the argu-
ment that a constitutional right of revolt was unthinkable or absurd to the Framers con-
tradicts some rather obvious historical evidence to the contrary." Glenn Harlan 
Reynolds, A Critical Guide co the Second Amendment, 62 Tenn. L. Rev. 461,472 (1995). 
Like Volokh's claim, Reynolds' statement is plausible and modest, and Professor Cornell 
provides no refutation of what Reynolds actually said. 
29. Sec Michael A. Bellesiles, Suicide Pact: New Readings of the Second Amend-
mel!/, 16 Const. Comm. 247 (1999); Don Higginbotham, The Second Amendmelll in His-
torical Colllext, 16 Const. Comm. 263 (1999); Robert E. Shalhupe, To Keep and Bear 
Arms in the Early Republic, 16 Const. Comm. 269 (1999). 
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lenged? And, not least in importance, does the Fourteenth 
Amendment render the right good against action by state gov-
ernments? 
A. HALBROOK'S ARGUMENT 
Halbrook's book takes on this last question, and offers a 
thundering "yes." The nature of Halbrook's argument can be il-
lustrated with what he offers as his single most striking piece of 
evidence. The very same Congress that sent the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the states for ratification also voted overwhelm-
ingly for a Freedmen's Bureau bill that created special, tempo-
rary law enforcement authority for areas in which the war had 
interrupted the ordinary operation of the judiciary.30 That stat-
ute specifically provided that 
the right to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, 
and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and 
convey real and personal property, and to have full and equal 
benefit of all laws and proceedings concerning personal lib-
erty, personal security, and the acquisition, enjoyment, and 
disposition of estate, real and personal, including the constitu-
tional right to bear arms, shall be secured to and enjoyed by 
all the citizens of such State or district without respect to race 
or color, or previous condition of slavery. 31 
This evidence alone suggests at least three propositions. First, 
that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment believed that 
the constitutional right to bear arms is a personal right-an as-
pect of "personal liberty, personal security" -rather than some 
sort of right to serve in the government's military organizations. 
Second, that these framers specifically and consciously decided 
that it was absolutely essential that this personal right to arms be 
extended to the freed slaves, notwithstanding the obvious dan-
gers in arming a largely uneducated group of people who had 
good reason to be filled with resentments of the most profound 
nature. Third, that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment 
believed that the personal right to bear arms should be "secured 
to and enjoyed by all the citizens." 
It looks like a short step, though it may not really be so 
short, from these plausible propositions to the further conclusion 
30. The bill, which was enacted over President Johnson's veto, was supported by a 
coalition almost identical to the one that sent the Fourteenth Amendment to the states. 
(pp. 41-42) 
31. Act of July 16,1866,14 Stat. 173,176 (1866) (emphasis added). 
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that the right to arms is protected from state infringements by 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, just as it is protected by the 
Second Amendment from federal infringements. The bulk of 
Halbrook's book is devoted to amassing additional evidence 
supporting this conclusion. From detailed descriptions of the 
simultaneous evolution of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, and the Freedmen's Bureau statute in Con-
gress, to the ratification struggle over the constitutional amend-
ment, and the subsequent Reconstruction statutes, Halbrook 
convincingly shows that legal protection for the individual right 
to arms was a central and well-publicized element in the Repub-
lican effort to secure the results of the war. 
This shouldn't be much of a shocker. Whatever the exact 
contours of the rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment 
and the early civil rights statutes, none of those rights would 
mean much of anything if blacks and their white allies could be 
murdered or intimidated into submission by the Ku Klux Klan 
and various equivalents. And not having been gripped by fanta-
sies of universal disarmament, those intent on preventing the 
restoration of racial despotism would naturally have sought to 
stop state governments from stripping the freedmen of their abil-
ity to defend themselves against those who were obviously intent 
on violent oppression. 
There can be little doubt that the Thirty-Ninth Congress 
was quite serious about preventing the effective reenslavement 
of the freedmen, and that this required federal measures to pre-
vent selective disarmament of blacks (and of white supporters of 
blacks' rights). But this could have been accomplished without 
depriving the states of their full discretion to adopt nondiscrimi-
natory restrictions on the right to arms. In order to find that 
Congress meant to go farther than prohibiting selective disar-
mament, one needs to show that the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause "incorporates" the Bill of Rights, or at least that the right 
to arms is among the privileges and immunities substantively 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Halbrook argues for substantive incorporation of all the in-
dividual rights in the Bill of Rights. The debate over this theory 
of "total incorporation"32 was well advanced before this book 
32. Though commonly employed, this term is something of a misnomer: nobody 
supposes that the Fourteenth Amendment could possibly "incorporate" the entire Bill of 
Rights, which includes the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. If the Second Amendment 
were properly interpreted to protect a right belonging to states rather than to mdlVIduals, 
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appeared, and I did not find in it any significant new evidence or 
argument. It is also a debate that is not so easily resolved as 
Halbrook maintains. 
There is certainly evidence that some members of the 
Thirty-Ninth Congress believed in the "total incorporation" the-
ory, or something very like it. But the legislative history also of-
fers support for treating the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
primarily as a prohibition against discriminatory abridgement of 
state-created rights, like the Comity Clause33 on which it was 
modeled and like the Civil Rights Act of 1866 whose question-
able constitutionalitt was t~e main provo~ation for th~ Fo~r­
teenth Amendment.- If this second readmg of the legislative 
history is correct, then the incorporation theory is not necessar-
ily foreclosed, but saving it requires one to show that the right to 
keep and bear arms is among the "privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States" referred to in the Fourteenth 
Amendment. At first, it may seem obvious that every individual 
right protected by the federal Constitution and the Bill of Rights 
falls into this category. After all, even the notorious Slaughter-
House Cases,35 which began a long tradition of narrowly constru-
ing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, acknowledged that 
rights created by the Constitution are substantively protected.36 
But it's not quite so obvious, and the Cruikshank case (to 
which Halbrook devotes so much attention) shows why. Cruik-
shank involved a federal prosecution that arose from a gun bat-
tle in which the white defendants and others allegedly massacred 
a large number of blacks who had gathered together for mutual 
protection after a black citizen had been shot down at his home 
by a group of whites. The first two counts of the indictment al-
leged an intent to deprive the black victims of their rights 
"peaceably to assemble together" and to "keep and bear arms 
for a lawful purpose." As in Slaughter-House, the Supreme 
it might be appropriate to treat it like the Ninth and Tenth Amendments arc treated. It 
is true that a similar argument against incorporating the Establishment Clause has been 
dismissed with barely a wave of the hand, for example, Abington School Dist. v. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,254-56 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring), but this docs not mean 
that the argument was wrong or that the Supreme Court can be counted on to treat the 
Second Amendment as it has the Establishment Clause. 
33. U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 2: "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all 
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." 
34. Another scholarly practitioner presented in detail the argument and evidence 
supporting this interpretation of the Clause. Sec generally John Harrison, Reconstruct-
ing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 Yale L.J. 1385 (1992). 
35. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). 
36. Sec id. at 74-80. 
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Court conceded that the federal government is empowered to 
protect rights created by or under the federal Constitution, such 
as the right of assembling to petition Congress. 37 These are 
rights concomitant with one's status as a citizen of the United 
States. But most rights, including the general rights of peaceable 
assembly and arms bearing, were not created by the Constitution 
and are not attributes of national citizenship. The Bill of Rights 
did not create them, but only forbade the federal government 
from infringing them. For that reason, the Second Amendment 
did not give Congress authority to protect the right to arms, and 
the Court concluded that this authority presumptively remains 
with the states.38 
Cruikshank did not develop this line of analysis with satisfy-
ing rigor, and it may be wrong. But it is not absurd. It is also 
consistent with the main theme that emerges from Halbrook's 
historical evidence: that the Fourteenth Amendment was at a 
minimum meant to prevent the discriminatory disarmament of 
blacks and their supporters. 39 That, for example, is exactly what 
the Freedmen's Bureau statute did, and it is just what the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 did with respect to other state-created rights. 
In order to show that Cruikshank was wrong, one would have to 
undertake a far more comprehensive study of the Fourteenth 
Amendment than Halbrook provides. 
Notwithstanding this reservation, I should emphasize that 
Halbrook does succeed in showing that if the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause was meant to provide substantive protection of 
rights other than those peculiarly created by or under the federal 
Constitution, the right to keep and bear arms simply must be 
one of those included within its ambit. That demonstration is 
made convincing primarily by the persistence and consistency 
with which protection of the right to arms was treated as a cen-
tral element in accomplishing the Reconstruction goal of secur-
ing equal civil rights. But one incident from the period offers a 
particularly useful illustration because it shows that the framers 
of the Fourteenth Amendment certainly did not believe that the 
Second Amendment's prefatory allusion to a "well regulated mi-
litia" means that the right to keep and bear arms is some sort of 
37. See Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552-53 (1875). 
38. See id. at 553. 
39. The first two counts of the indictment at issue in Cruikshank do not appear to 
have alleged a racially discriminatory intent, and the Court's discussion of other counts 
shows that it was unwilling to read such allegations into the indictment. See id. at 542, 
554-55. 
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right belonging only to governments or those engaged in gov-
ernment service. 
One of the favored mechanisms for disarming and terroriz-
ing the black population immediately after the war was appar-
ently through "militias" composed largely of ex-Confederate 
soldiers. Accordingly, Senator James Wilson (R.-Iowa), chair-
man of the judiciary committee, introduced a bill in early 1866 to 
disarm and disband the militia forces in most of the southern 
states. The bill drew immediate opposition on the ground that it 
violated the Second Amendment, but the debate was not pur-
sued until the following Session. (pp. 20-21) The next year, Wil-
son brought his bill up again. Again, it encountered substantial 
opposition, and not just from Democrats or Southern sympa-
thizers. Senator Waitman Willey (R. -W. Va.), for example, fa-
vored "discriminating legislation that would regulate the use of 
arms by the militia in the South," presumably because such legis-
lation was needed and is authorized by Article I.4() (p. 68) But 
Willey would not agree to a bill "depriving men of the right to 
bear arms and the total disarming of men in time of peace." (p. 
68) Similarly, Senator Thomas Hendricks (D.-Ind.) quoted the 
Second Amendment, and concluded that "[i]f this [bill] infringes 
the right of the people to bear arms we have no authority to 
adopt it." (p. 68) Wilson then modified the bill so that it "dis-
banded" the militias without "disarming" them. The bill was en-
acted in that form. (p. 69) 
This incident perfectly illustrates why the Second Amend-
ment had been adopted in the first place. The original Constitu-
tion had given Congress virtually plenary authority to regulate 
the militia, and Congress might easily consider it necessary and 
proper to enact civilian disarmament schemes in the form of mi-
litia regulations, as Wilson's initial bill would have done. The 
Second Amendment rules this out, and it is significant that even 
this most radically Republican Congress was unwilling to de-
prive ex-Confederates of the right to keep and bear their private 
arms. This is strong evidence indeed that those who gave us the 
Fourteenth Amendment believed that the right to arms is a 
fundamental constitutional right deserving of the most 
40. U.S. Canst., Art. I,§ 8, cl. 15-16, provides Congress with the power 
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, 
suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; 
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the \1ilitia, and for 
governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United 
States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, 
and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed 
by Congress. 
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damental constitutional right deserving of the most scrupulous 
protection. If they meant for the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause to offer substantive protection for rights like most of 
those in the Bill of Rights, this right cannot be an exception. 
B. HALBROOK'S PROBLEM WITH THE COURTS 
Having marshaled his evidence, Halbrook is confronted 
with two obvious problems. First, if the Supreme Court ever 
thought that it was constrained by what the framers and ratifiers 
of the Fourteenth Amendment thought they were doing, it gave 
that notion up a very long time ago. Second, the Court has 
never recognized any security for the right to arms against state 
action. 
There's not much that Halbrook can do about the first 
problem, except to hope that the Court will some day come to its 
senses. Halbrook does point to language in some of the Court's 
opinions that is easily broad enough to justify incorporating the 
Second Amendment. But this doesn't get one very far because 
there is little reason to suppose that a Court that has been so 
blithely unconcerned with the original meaning of the Four-
teenth Amendment would think that mere logic compelled it to 
incorporate a provision of the Bill of Ri~hts unless the Justices 
think that doing so would be good policy. 1 
Halbrook makes a more practically useful point when he 
argues that the Supreme Court has never rejected Fourteenth 
Amendment protection of the right to arms, though I believe the 
Court has at times come closer to doing so than he acknowl-
edges. Cruikshank is a good example. Because the case in-
volved a prosecution for a private conspiracy, Halbrook believes 
the Court had no occasion to consider whether the Fourteenth 
Amendment forbids state abridgements of the right to arms. (p. 
172) The Court's holding on the right to arms, however, was not 
based on state action grounds. The Enforcement Act authorized 
prosecutions for private conduct, so long as the private conduct 
was aimed at the deprivation of federal rights. Implicitly avoid-
ing the state action issue, the Court asked whether the rights of 
41. There is an argument, which Halbrook doesn't mention, that incorporation of 
the Second Amendment is compelled by the substantive due process tests set out in 
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), and Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
Sec Lund, 31 Ga. L. Rev. at 49-55 (cited in note 23). That argument, however, depends 
on the heroic assumption that the Supreme Court would regard the tests adopted in 
those cases as legally binding, rather than as evolving doctrines that arc every bit as mal-
leable as substantive due process itself. 
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assembly and arms-bearing are federal rights. 42 The Court said 
"no," on the ground that protection of these rights was a state 
responsibility that had not been shifted to the federal govern-
ment by the First and Second Amendments. The Court's con-
clusion, that these are not federal rights, is inconsistent with "in-
corporation," though the Court did not even discuss the 
possibility that the Privileges or Immunities Clause may have 
converted the right to arms into a federal right. 
The failure to discuss this possibility is particularly interest-
ing because another count in the indictment almost compelled 
the Cruikshank Court to confront it. That count alleged a race-
based deprivation of "the rights, privileges, immunities, and pro-
tection" belonging to the victims as citizens of the United States 
and of their state of residence. One might expect the Court to 
have sustained this count either on the ground that the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause applies to discriminatory deprivations of 
state-law rights or on the ground that it makes the right to arms 
a federal right. But the Court did neither, holding instead (in a 
passage that Halbrook does not discuss) that the indictment was 
too vague to satisfy the Sixth Amendment.43 
The best reading of Cruikshank, I believe, is that the Court 
was deliberately avoiding the incorporation question because it 
is genuinely difficult. Of course, that leaves Halbrook's main 
point intact: I agree that Cruikshank did not rule out incorpora-
tion of the right to arms, and I also agree that it has not been 
ruled out subsequently. When the Court finally gets around to 
deciding whether the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the states 
to abridge the right to keep and bear arms, it will at least not 
have the excuse that the issue was settled long ago. 
C. THE INCORPORATION DEBATE 
Halbrook's dream, that the courts will eventually recognize 
a Fourteenth Amendment right to keep and bear arms, does not 
necessarily depend upon a claim that the Second Amendment 
applies against the states by virtue of its "incorporation" in the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Much of his argumentation, however, 
plausibly assumes that incorporation would be the path most in-
viting for the courts. But isn't this hopelessly naive? Incorpora-
tion has never had anything to do with the Privileges or Immuni-
42. Cruikshank invoked a state action requirement with respect to other counts in 
the indictment, but not with respect to these. 
43. Sec Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 557-58. 
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ties Clause, having proceeded entirely on the basis of willful in-
vention. 
The willfulness of the Court in this area has gone well be-
yond the natural human tendency to resolve competing legal ar-
guments in the way that accords with one's own policy prefer-
ences. First, incorporation has proceeded under the aegis of the 
Due Process Clause, through the oxymoronic doctrine of "sub-
stantive due process." Second, the Court began incorporating 
various provisions of the Bill of Rights without the sli~htest ef-
fort to explain how or why such a thing was justified. Third, 
such efforts as there have been to provide a rationalizing princi-
ple for this behavior have relied on the supposedly deep but 
barely articulated ghilosophizing of certain Justices about the 
meaning of liberty. Fourth, the Court has flitted among the Bill 
of Rights, sometimes pecking away with one supposedly legal 
test and sometimes with another, carrying some rights back to 
the sheltering nest of substantive due process and castin~ others 
out, but never even seeking to unify its various decisions. 6 
If it is fair to call Halbrook naive, that should be a term of 
praise, for his book is permeated with faith in the proposition 
that it should matter what the misty clause about privileges or 
immunities meant to those who placed it in our Constitution. 
Like the Second Amendment, the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause was until recently rarely taken seriously by legal academ-
ics, and partly for the same reason that the Second Amendment 
was ignored for so long: the courts didn't take it seriously. And 
like the Second Amendment, Privileges or Immunities has been 
rediscovered in large part through the efforts of scholarly legal 
practitioners. Although legal academics have not been so absent 
from the field in this case as in debates about the right to arms,47 
two of the most important major figures in the modern incorpo-
ration debate have been scholarly practitioners: Raoul Berger 
44. Sec, for example, Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931 ), in which the 
Court relied solely on unexplained dicta in prior cases to hold that the right of free 
speech is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 
45. Sec, e.g., Palko v. Connecriclll, 302 U.S. at 327. 
46. Sec, for example, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), where the Court 
threw out Palko's theory that incorporation applies only to those rights that arc "of the 
verv essence of a scheme of ordered liberty" and replaced it with a new test under which 
a r{ght must be "necessary to an Anglo-Amnican regime of ordered liberty." Sec id. at 
149-50 n. 14. The Court made no effort to explain how the free speech or religion provi-
sions of the First Amendment could pass this new test, given the facts of British legal his-
tory. 
47. In line with my focus on the contributions of legal practitioners, I omit anum-
ber of citations to professional academics that might otherwise be obligatory. 
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held occasional temporary appointments in law schools, but he 
spent almost all of his career in practice, while Michael Kent 
Curtis entered legal academia only after he wrote his book on 
incorporation. While Berger and Curtis came to opposite con-
clusions about incorporation,48 they shared Halbrook's nai've ap-
proach to constitutional interpretation. And we are all much the 
richer for it.49 
The oddity of this is striking. One might think that academ-
ics would be more free to seek the truth for its own sake, while 
practitioners would be more apt to have their vision confined 
within horizons established by the courts. The disdain of legal 
academics toward the Second Amendment might be explained 
largely by hostility to guns and those who own them, but the 
same cannot be said about the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 
for the academic establishment has not exhibited much reluc-
tance about the policy of applying the federal bill of rights 
against the states. A more likely story, and one that would apply 
both to incorporation and to the Second Amendment, might fo-
cus on the self interest of academics. It's more fun to spend 
one's time coming up with arguments and theories that explain 
why the Constitution should be interpreted to produce what 
we're sure would be a better world than to figure out what its 
makers meant by what they said. The Justices, too, often exhibit 
the same fun-loving spirit, which means that imitating them is 
more likely to influence them. And, perhaps not least important 
in terms of academic incentives, it is a whole lot easier to give 
voice to one's moral and political intuitions than to discover 
something significantly new about the Constitution's original 
meaning. Besides, such conjurings from intuition are pretty 
much immune to objective falsification, which makes this kind of 
theorizing pretty safe for the career-minded scholar. Especially 
when one is among the large majority blessed with academically 
fashionable political opinions. Writers like Halbrook are not 
48. Compare Raoul Berger, Governmem by Judiciary: The Transformmion of the 
Fourteemh Amendmem (Harvard U. Press, 1977) (Fourteenth Amendment covers only 
racial discrimination involving the rights enumerated in the Civil Rights Act of 1866), 
with Michael Kent Curtis, No State Shall Abridge: The Fourteemh Amendmem and the 
Bill of Rights (Duke U. Press, 1986) (Privileges or Immunities Clause was meant to apply 
the protections of the Bill of Rights, as well as other fundamental rights, to the states). 
49. In the 1988 edition of American Constitutional Law at 772 n.5 (cited in note 18), 
Professor Tribe claimed that the "total incorporation" theory advanced in Hugo Black's 
dissent in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), had not "won scholarly approval," 
Citing only Professor Charles Fairman's famous 1949 attack on Justice Black. This ig-
nored Curtis' detailed critique of Fairman, as well as Curtis' debate with Berger. 
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subject to such incentives, which may help to explain why practi-
tioners continue to make important scholarly contributions. 
CONCLUSION 
Stephen Halbrook has written an old-fashioned book, of a 
kind that requires a great deal of diligent research and a willing-
ness to relate in detail what other people said and did. Because 
these other people were the ones who made a particularly im-
portant provision of our Constitution, this is a valuable book 
that should be useful to those who claim to take the Constitution 
seriously. 
This is not to say that we have been given the last word on 
the right to arms under the Fourteenth Amendment. Halbrook 
is a talented and indefatigable advocate in the cause of firearms 
rights, who reads the evidence for all it's worth, and sometimes 
more. This is a risk, of course, that every student of the Four-
teenth Amendment's origins must run, simply because the text is 
so ambiguous and the relevant history so voluminous and varie-
gated. It is also true that Halbrook does not attempt to confront 
all of the academic work on the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 
and cannot resolve the most serious disagreements that have 
arisen among its students. Nevertheless, Halbrook's evidence 
seems quite adequate to establish that if the Privileges or Immu-
nities Clause was meant to incorporate the substance of any of 
the individual privileges and immunities in the Bill of Rights, it 
was certainly meant to protect the individual's right to keep and 
bear arms. 
It is less clear whether any of this will ever matter to those 
who are most obviously charged with taking the Constitution se-
riously. For well over a century after its decision in the Slaugh-
ter-House Cases, the Supreme Court treated the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause almost as though it had been written in San-
skrit or obliterated by an ink blot:50 in all that time, only one 
holdinp invoked the Clause, and that decision was soon over-
ruled.5 The Court recently signaled a revival of interest in the 
Clause, but it did so in a way that suggests a continuing solipsis-
50. Cf. Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the 
Law 166 (Free Press, 1990) (approving such treatment of the Clause). 
51. See generally Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935), overruled by Madden v. 
Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83,93 (1940). 
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tic elevation of its own precedents and its own philosophizing 
over the original meaning of the Constitution. 52 
In Saenz v. Roe,53 the Court struck down a California law 
that limited new residents, for the first year they live in the state, 
to the level of welfare benefits they would have received in their 
prior state of residence. Seizing on a dictum in Slaughter-
House-according to which "a citizen of the United States can, 
of his own volition, become a citizen of any State of the Union 
by a bona fide residence therein, with the same rights as other 
citizens of that State"- the Court applied strict scrutiny and 
concluded that California did not have an adequate justification 
for discriminating between new arrivals and established resi-
dents. As Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out in his dissent, the 
Slaughter-House dictum is quite compatible with allowing states 
to employ objective criteria such as durational residence re-
quirements to test a new resident's intent to remain before pro-
viding all the benefits of citizenship.54 More important, as Justice 
Thomas noted in his dissent, the Saenz majority proceeded with-
out the slightest effort "to understand what the framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment thought that it meant," and thereby 
raised "the specter that the Privileges or Immunities Clause will 
become yet another convenient tool for inventing new rights, 
limited solely by the 'predilections of those who happen at the 
time to be Members of this Court. "'55 
Like Halbrook and many of the other scholarly practitio-
ners who have done so much to recover the lost thoughts that 
underlie the Second and Fourteenth Amendments, Justice Tho-
mas takes the na"ive starting point that the Constitution means 
what it was meant to mean. Should a majority of the Court ever 
be seized with the same grace and modesty, books like Hal-
brook's will become more important than they have been in the 
past. This might not produce a judicial recognition of the robust 
right to private arms that Halbrook hopes for, but it should at 
52. Notwithstanding the conventional wisdom, which holds that incorporation 
through the Privileges or Immunities Clause is foreclosed by Slaughter-House, yet an-
other scholarly practitioner has made a case for upsetting this consensus. Sec Kevin 
Christopher Newsom, Setting lncorporationism Straight: A Reinterpretation of the Slaugh-
ter-House Cases, 109 Yale L.J. 643 (2000). Sad to say, it is quite conceivable that the Jus-
tices would be more impressed by arguments about the original meaning of its own 
precedents than by evidence of the original meaning of the Constitution itself. 
53. 526 U.S. 489 (1999). 
54. Sec id. at 517 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
55. Id. at 528 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 
494,502 (1977)). 
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least produce more careful thinking about the subject than the 
Court has managed in the past. 
